Ecole Nationale de la Photographie, Arles
First lecture on Feb. 23, 84; Photo production.

I shall define "photograph" as an image which is produced and distributed through apparatus, and which, being an image, carries an information on its surface. Thus I shall be concerned, in this lecture, with the production of this information. This requires a cursory consideration of "communication":

Let "communication" be the process of production, distribution and stockage of information. Thus defined, human communication will be seen as "specifically human", in the sense that man is the only species which distributes and stocks information produced, "acquired", by himself. "Human communication" becomes synonymous with "mind" or "spirit". The first phase of communication, "production", becomes synonymous with "creation", the second phase, "distribution", synonymous with "history", and the third phase, "stockage", synonymous with "culture". And "to be committed to communication" becomes synonymous with "to be committed against nature and in favor of culture". To explain this last statement, let me define "information".

Let "information" be any improbable situation. According to the Second principle of thermodynamics nature as a whole tends toward "entropy", i.e. ever more probable situations. However, improbable situations do arise by accident in nature: like galaxies, life on earth, human brains and so forth. Those informative situations must, of necessity, return to the general tendency toward entropy, they are "epicycles". Man is committed to the deliberate production of such epicycles. His is a commitment against the entropic tendency of nature, against this tendency toward "thermic death", toward death tout court. Thus, to say that man is committed to communication amounts to saying that man is committed against the natural tendency toward death and in favor of the cultural tendency toward memorability.

Let me call the first phase of communication, namely "production of information", the "dialogical process". Information is produced by dialogue, namely by an exchange of previous informations stocked in various memories, with a view to synthetizing these informations to become new ones. This dialogical process may go on within a single memory, ("inner dialogue"), in which case this single memory may be seen as being a "set of memories". This is the case of so-called "creative persons". There can be no information production "ex nihilo". Every dialogue presupposes the existence of stocked information. That is; it presupposes a previous discourse which has supplied the information stocked.

The discursive process is one by which information stocked in a memory is transmitted to other memories for them to stock it in their turn. Therefore, in discourse, but not in dialogue, we can distinguish between an emitter and a receiver of information. A photograph is an example of discourse. It is emitted information in search of a receiver. Its purpose is to be stocked in a memory, to be then used in a subsequent dialogue for the purpose of synthetizing new information. Thus the photographer is a memory which has elaborated some new information through "inner" and "outer" dialogue, and which now emits this information in search of a subsequent dialogue with other memories out there. And the photograph is a discursive "media" between dialogues.
The photograph is a specific media in at least three aspects: (a) an artificial memory, (the camera), has participated in the dialogue which has produced the information it carries. (b) it carries this information in the form of a surface image. (c) its discourse is one of multiple reproduction, and its stockage is one of artificial memorization. The photograph shares these aspects with other media, (the "technical images"), and it differs from those other media by the fact that it is a "leaflet", (pamphlet). I shall consider today the first aspect only, namely the fact that the information carried by photographs is the result of a dialogue between the photographer's memory and the memory of a camera apparatus.

The photo camera is a hard black box, (hardware), which contains a program, (software). It is a rather primitive apparatus. That program contains, in its turn, all the photographs which this camera can "take". Which is a vast, but not an infinitely vast amount of possible, "virtual", pictures. Those virtual pictures constitute the camera memory, and it is with that memory that the photographer is in dialogue. His commitment is to realize some of those virtual pictures according to information contained in its own memory, and to produce new information.

The camera memory has been programmed by people employed in a photo industry, and thus the photographer dialogues with those people. But those people have, in their turn, elaborated that program in a dialogue with the industrial program, which is a memory which contains a vast amount of virtual camera programs. The program of the photo industry is, in its turn, programmed by people who are employed in elaborating the programs of the industrial park of a country. The program of that industry complex is, in its turn, programmed by people who are elaborating the economic, cultural, political and ideological program of a society. And this program, again, is elaborated at some "higher" level. In all those programming, dialogical processes people are involved with ever more complex "artificial memories", with ever more complex hard and soft apparatus. In the last analysis, therefore, the photographer dialogues with this transhuman hierarchy of programs. His is a dialogue with a memory which is only partly human, and partly it is autonomous of human decision, namely "automatic". Which is what characterizes information production in all technical images, and, in general, the new, emerging, cultural situation.

The camera program has a specific structure. The virtual pictures it contains are clear and distinct elements: it is a "quantic", grain-like structure. And the camera is equipped with a button, ("releaser"), which makes the camera spit one clear and distinct picture after the other, (arithmetic structure). Therefore the dialogue between photographer and camera follows this quantic, arithmetic structure, which is not the structure of human dialogue in other situations. In other terms: in his dialogue with the camera the photographer takes a series of clear and distinct point-like decisions. This sort of decision is characteristic of apparatus: example the American president's red button. It is neither an existential nor a methodical decision, but it is a "decision actum". This is why no single picture, but only the whole series, can show what the photographer has intended.

Before pressing the releaser, the photographer must adjust his camera for a specific "vision". Those adjustments are inscribed in the camera program. Although
the photographer may look at anything he wants, he must look at everything through
the camera vision. Now this vision lets the world appear in a specific space-time
structure, which is unlike the structure of human vision. It is a space composed
of clear and distinct compartments: close, panoramic, frog's eye, and so forth. And
a time composed of distinct periods: very short, short, medium, long vision time and
so forth. This camera space-time structure of the camera program imposes itself
upon the world like a net, and it structures all individual or social human visions.
Thus the camera vision is supra-individual and supra-social, it is the same for all
photographers, be they occidental or oriental, capitalist or proletarian, First or
Third world. It is a universally valid vision, and it does away with all previous
culturally determined world vision. This is characteristic of the emerging cultur-
al situation: universal mass culture.

The structure of this world vision being composed of clear and distinct
compartments, the photographer has to choose between compartments before pressing
the releaser. He jumps from compartment to compartment. Every jump is thus pre-
ceded by a doubt: what point of view shall I take? Like the photographer's decision
his doubt is quantic; neither the existential doubt of man, nor the methodical doubt
of science, but a doubt composed of point-like instants. It shows that the photo-
grapher has no preferential point of view, (no "ideology"), but his aim is a maxi-
mum of points of view, all of them equivalent and mutually permutable ones. This
is why photographic doubt may be called "phenomenological doubt", and his attitude
toward the world is a post-ideological one, even if he may believe that he is mak-
ing ideologically motivated pictures.

Two kinds of photographers must be distinguished. Let the first type
be called the "snap shooter", and the second one the "photographer in the strict
sense". The snap shooter aims at making pictures in accordance with the camera
program. He wants pictures of ever new situations, looked at through ever the same
camera structure. The true photographer aims at making pictures which are improbabil
in the camera program: although they are inscribed in it, they are "accidents" of
that program. In other terms: the true photographer looks for information. He want
to at always the same situation with ever changing vision structure. This is why
the snap shooter loves camera automation, whereas the true photographer fights au-
tomation. The vast majority of the photographs are snap shots. What is of interest
however are the photographs which were made in search of information. Because in
the dialogue "snap shooter-camera", it is the camera program which dominates, and
in the dialogue "true photographer-camera" it is human intention which tries to
dominate apparatus program. An example for the fight of human freedom in a situation
dominated by ever more automatic apparatus.

For the true photographer the camera is a tool for the production of
improbable, unforeseen, not futurable situations, for information production. This
is his typically human commitment. The world outside is for him a mere pre-text. He
does not aim at "documenting" the world, but at giving the world a new meaning, to
be used by other in subsequent information production. He is not really interested
in the world outside, but in hidden camera virtualities which he is trying to dis-
cover. This is characteristic for the apparatus situation: not to "know" the world, nor to "change" it, (to work), is human commitment from now on, but to give the world new meanings, (post-historical situation, where work is relegated on automatic machines, and where man is free to propose meaning to the world and his existence within the world).

The true photographer intends to make pictures which may be used as models for the experience, the knowledge, and the evaluation of their receivers. As I shall try to show in one of the following lectures, images are potent models. If one calls models of experience "art", models of knowledge "science", and models of evaluation "ethics" or "politics", it becomes evident that photographing in the true sense is much more than an artistic endeavor. It is a fully human endeavor, where art, science, and ethics cannot be distinguished the one from the other. This is "fully human", because man can experience nothing without knowing it and evaluating it, know nothing without experiencing and evaluating it, and evaluate nothing without experiencing and knowing it. Thus true photographing overcomes the modern distinction between politics, art and science. It is a post-modern commitment.

The true commitment of the photographer is thus to supply models for others; to "inform" others. He aims at becoming "immortal" within the memory of others through the medium of an image. I shall discuss in the next lecture how this commitment is affected by the automatic reproducibility of images, and by the way they are distributed. Here I must note that this ultimate commitment of the photographer toward the others may come to be forgotten as the photographer fights camera-automation. The camera may absorb his full attention. This forgetting of the ultimate aim of photography, (which is the forgetting of oneself within the production process), is the mark of creativity; the creative photographer, as every creative man, is absorbed by his fight against the perfidy inertia of matter. But in the photographer's case "matter" is the camera software, which includes other people.

Thus it becomes evident that the photographer is engaged in a struggle against apparatus function. His dialogue with the camera is polemic. Now the apparatus function is one of co-implication of machines and men, (the "fonctionnaires"). In fact, the true photographer "contests" that which the functionaries of the apparatus have programmed. His is the struggle of human freedom of decision against programs as elaborated by functionaries, technocrats, and all the others who live in function of an apparatus. In this sense the true photographer is an example for post-industrial "creative contestation". Thus the problem whether the photographers intention can prevail over automatic programs, or whether those programs will in the end prevail over human intention becomes a central problem for the future. On the answer depends whether we are heading toward a new type of creative freedom, or toward apparatus totalitarianism.

Before concluding this lecture, I must consider a paradox which is implied in what I was saying. Apparatus of the type "photo camera" were invented for the purpose of producing information. They are typically human tools for the production, distribution and storage of information. For this purpose the apparatus have been
automated, which means: built in a way which permits them to produce information without human interference. Example: satellite pictures. Automatic cameras are meant to make the photographer redundant. In fact: if we want to document the world, it is best not to have any photographer at all involved in the process. However, there is a dialectics involved in automation. Automatic apparatus produces information by programmed accident, and what it does is in fact a great acceleration of the frequency of accidents in the entropic world out there. Apparatus are ultra-rapid "idiots", if by idiocy we mean the tendency of the world, which is to say that the very information produced by automation is somehow foreseeable, futurably, and this again means that it is "dis-information". It is not "surprising", unexpected, but it becomes what is expected from the program. Thus apparatus automation meant to produce information, ends up by resulting in disinformation.

This is the reason why the true photographer is committed against automation. His aim is to force apparatus to somehow invert its program like a glove, and have it produce that which is unexpected from the point of view of the program. Thus what we have here is the attempt to face the fact that the apparatus we have produced tend to escape from our control, tend to become autonomous of human decision. I believe that this is the context in which we must see the photographer's commitment: to oppose against the stupidity of automatic disinformation the human intention to produce, to distribute and to stock new information, and thus overcome death and become somehow immortal.