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Writing Philosophy.

On Vilém Flusser’s Multilingual Dialogical Style

„Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten.“

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen

In 1998, seven years after Flusser’s death, at the very height of his success as a digital thinker and media-theorist the German-Austrian editor Böhlau published Elizabeth Neswald’s critical appraisal Medien-Theologie. Das Werk Vilém Flussers – Media-Theology. Vilém Flusser’s Work. Despite its subtitle, Neswald’s book pursues a reductionist agenda, dealing exclusively with the later part of Flusser’s oeuvre written mostly in German and after his return to Europe in the early 1970ies. Furthermore, she utterly ignores the main shaping philosophical influences on Flusser’ work reducing its manifold complexity to one single dimension. Flusser’s whole endeavor, she argues, is motivated by a deep cultural pessimism and a religiously inspired research for meaning. This leads to the creation of apocalyptic scenarios wavering between visions of technological annihilation and utopian aspirations for redemption.

On Jargon

Neswald dedicates a chapter to Flusser’s use of rhetorical tropes in an attempt to prove what she calls his manipulative rhetoric of inauthenticity, in German, “die Rhetorik der Uneigentlichkeit” (Neswald 1998: 119). The resemblance with Adorno’s description of Heidegger’s ideological use of language as “Jargon der Eigentlichkeit”, jargon of authen-
ticity, even if possibly not intended, is unmistakable. Even if Neswald, astonishingly
enough, does not explicitly deal with this aspect, the intimate connection between
Heidegger’s and Flusser’s style and use of German is undeniable. In fact, one might argue,
that Flusser’s writing impetus was sparked, among other things, by his confrontation in
the early 1950ies with Heidegger whose style he avidly incorporated in his own writing
turning it, however, to completely different philosophical ends.

Jargon is an instrument of deceit. Flusser’s style, so Neswald, attempts to force
the reader into submission, leaving him but two possible reactions: refusal or surrender (ibid.: 108). The reduction of the argumentation to a few significant terms, the very suggestiveness of the texts, and the beginning in medias res are bound to attract and subdue the reader’s attention. The constant use of clauses suggesting relativity creates a false sense of openness but the result is already secretly spelled out in between the lines from the very beginning (ibid.: 106). The rhetorical devices reenact in the text what the author has personally gone through: the unity of the world has been shattered and fallen apart, certainties have dissolved, and a feeling of ultimate inauthenticity prevails. “Nothing is definitive or final; reality deceives; connections are arbitrary; everything is relative.” The argumentative plurality and the semantic ambiguity created therewith invite the reader to take part in the construction of a suitable meaning. Through this, however, he will more easily accept the outcome of the text as being true, having taken part himself in its construction. “The reader is temporarily disoriented” by the shifting structure of the text. As he is unable to test its inner coherence, so Neswald, he is at the mercy of the author gladly accepting any offer of clarity from his hands. “The texts do not follow a rational, but an associative deductive strategy” (ibid. 123-4) (translation RG).³ To sum it up: Flusser’s texts deceitfully enact uncertainty and plurality of meaning in order to disorient the reader who is misleadingly asked to collaborate with the creation of a meaning that is not looked for but already there from the outset. At the same time, the bewildered reader desperately reaches out for any signal of clarity that might be on offer, happily accepting it without asking any questions.

I trust that none of you will recognize her- or himself in the dark picture of a helplessly seduced, powerless and subjugated reader drawn here. As a frequent reader of Flusser, I would have a very different story to tell: not subjugation but contradiction, fascination,

³ The simple opposition between rational and associative is, of course, rather arbitrary.
but not capitulation, bewilderment and surprise on end, without a final concluding meaning, and finally openness not foreclosure. But then, why deal with Neswald’s book at all? Because her detailed analysis of Flusser’s stylistic devices, even if based on a major misunderstanding, is unique within the critical reception of Flusser’s work. Even if Flusser’s philosophy is highly poetical and his writing very much literary in quality there has not been so far any systematic attempt at understanding Flusser as a writer. It is, furthermore, highly ironical that Flusser’s attempt at a redefinition of the relationship of philosophy and style, inspired by his reading of Heidegger, should end up by being misinterpreted this way. In fact, Neswald, attributes to Flusser a series of intentions that would well suit Heidegger’s philosophy but go against the very grain of Flusser’s life-long attempt at creating a dialogical relationship with his reader.\(^4\)

**The Scope of Flusser’s Rhetoric**

Let us now have a look at Neswald’s suggestions concerning Flusser’s stylistic strategies before engaging in a closer and more systematic analysis of the salient stylistic features of his texts and the authorial intentions they articulate: “Right from the beginning”, writes Neswald, “any reader of Flusser’s text will notice their peculiar semantic appearance.” Surprisingly enough there is no word as to the possible poetic beauty and intellectual sophistication of the texts. Personally speaking, it was the elegant, refined style and the brilliant play with words of Flusser’s late German texts that drew me to his work in the first place. “The texts”, continues Neswald, ”seem to consist to a great extent of metaphors and revitalized metaphors […], image areas and analogies. Add to this the […] frequent use of etymologies, as well as of puns based on homophony (paronomasia) and the simultaneous presence of different meanings in the case of polysemy. Etymologies […] also tend to develop into polysemy or paronomasia […]. These particular uses of language have a common trait: they carry an additional supplementary meaning […] forcing the reader to determine on his own the existing similarities between the single utterances. Fi-

\(^4\) Another text dealing with the question of Flusser’s style, if only marginally, is Friedrich Balke’s *Sola pictura. Überlegungen zu Vilém Flussers Buch ’Die Schrift’* (in: kultuRRevolutions, 17/18 (Mai 1988), p. 106-108.)

\(^5\) In an unpublished letter to Mira Schendel of the 27th September 1974 Flusser writes that his main interest in writing is the creation of an intersubjective style.
nally, there are also phonetic similarities to be found like alliterations, assonances and consonances. All these rhetoric tropes do not aim for certainty but have a tendency to semantic ambiguity. They are tropes of rhetoric loosening, repetition and multiplication” (ibid.: 109-110) (translation RG). And she concludes most correctly without actually realizing the radical implications of her interpretation: “A word refers to another word, and that means, to language itself” (ibid.: 111) (translation RG). I will come back to this essential point later on.

Neswald lists most of Flusser’s main stylistic strategies, supplying, however, only one example to prove her point, the German text “Zum Würfel” which possesses an extreme if not uncommon concentration of stylistic devices. If you add to this the fact that some major features are not even mentioned – for instance the technique of interpretation through comparison, the use of prefixes or the play with the literalness of words, especially in the later German texts – one feels forced to ask: How many of Flusser’s German texts has Neswald actually read? That is, on how many textual instances is her generalizing description actually based? It goes without saying that her corpus excludes all Portuguese, English and French texts, reducing even more the convincingly and complexity of her argumentation. In fact, how can Flusser’s shifting multilingual style whose presence is notably felt in all his texts – even if they are generally monolingual they conserve an implicit multilingual density due to their origin in manifold processes of translation and re-translation – be adequately described if one focuses on one language only, denying thus the very essence of his philosophical and stylistic enterprise?

The most problematic aspect of Neswald’s interpretation remains, nevertheless, as we have already seen, the one-sidedness of the conclusions she draws from her analysis. Flusser is indeed aiming for semantic ambiguity and a multiplication of possible points of view, however, not in order to destabilize and manipulate the reader but in order to enrich and enhance his approach based on a theoretical position consciously and consistently oscillating between discursive fields and different languages in an attempt to draw attention to the ultimate artificialness of interpretative models. Flusser’s systematic play with languages and words is not external to content, that is, purely ornamental; it corresponds to and articulates his philosophical position from within.
Flusser does not make use of all his stylistic strategies all the time. Sometimes they are applied on their own, sometimes in combination, sometimes the text can practically do without. In order to describe Flusser as a writer of philosophical texts one would, therefore, have to analyze the corpus as whole trying to establish the frequency of certain rhetorical tropes or stylistic strategies, the way they interact and the different textual functions that go with this. Questions linked to this endeavor would be: Is it possible to elaborate a specific typology of texts based on the presence and frequency of certain stylistic devices? Do the more associative essays about everyday objects, for instance, make more frequent use of poetical devices than the theoretical texts about communication and information or is there no real difference to be made out? Another question to be asked regards the formal differences between the four languages Flusser writes in: Are certain devices typical for one writing language or can they be found in all of them? Are the play with prefixes and the literalness of words, for instance, strategies that can be found above all in Flusser’s German texts? Is Flusser more of a poet in German and Portuguese than in English and French? Finally: Are there any changes to be made out within Flusser’s work as a whole? That is, can one write the story of the evolution of his style the same way one could write the development of his thought and in which ways are the two aspects related to each other? Naturally, I will not be able to answer all these questions. My intention, here, is to point to a possible new approach to Flusser’s work listing some of his most frequent stylistic devices with adequate examples from his multilingual work, trying to understand their multiple functions, that is, the authorial intentions they articulate.

On the Relationship of Poetry and Philosophy

Before coming to a short fragmentary and unsystematic inventory of Flusser’s favorite stylistic devices and the philosophical viewpoint they articulate, however, I would like to discuss briefly how he defines the relationship of philosophy and poetry and what other philosophers have inspired him in this task. Reflections on this specific subject can be found above all in his early Portuguese writing of the 1960ies and in his first, still unpublished book Das Zunächst Jahrhundert (The 20th Century), in which Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche play a central role.
Poetry is a higher form of philosophy and truly creative philosophy is also always part of the poetic level of language. „In German one would say that poetry corresponds to the area of the Einfall [German in the original]“, the thought, literally that which happens to fall into the mind (ein-fallen), generating a new original idea. To the poetic domain belong authentic poetry in the restricted sense of the word, productive philosophy and the other creative forms of science, as any poet “develops new ideas (and transfers these into the overall conversation)” (Flusser 1963: 163-4) (translation RG) This conception can be traced back to Heidegger. Poets are the ‘conditio sine qua non’ of philosophy, writes Flusser. Without poetry there can be no philosophy because authentic thoughts can only be inspired by the language in which they have been expressed (See also Flusser 1964: 551) That which is specific in poetic diction, no matter if it takes place in literature or philosophy, is not so much the opposition between the description of an existing world in science and a possible world in philosophy. The decisive moment is always the relationship with words, the specific use language is put to, the play with double meaning, “das Irisieren des Wortes” (Flusser 1957/58: 132), the iridescence of the word.” To pinpoint his writing method Flusser is again using a metaphor. In fact, iridescence refers to the property of certain surfaces which appear to change color as the angle of view changes. Iridescence is commonly seen in soap bubbles, butterfly wings, sea shells and clouds. In Greek mythology Iris is the messenger of Hera and the personification of the rainbow, the multicolored arch bridging the emptiness between heaven and earth. Flusser uses the term not only to describe his technique of multiplication of meaning implicit in the strategy of subsequent translations and retranslations but also for the constant play with connotations, alliterations, assonances, consonances and etymologies within a specific language. Iridescence, then, reveals a double pluriverse: the internal plurality of a single language and the manifold plurality of different linguistic universes. “The language of the philosopher is the mirror of his point of view. […] The philosopher is the genuine, perfect poet and the play with the word becomes an authentic game with the intellect. He has a more acute sense of the essence of language than all other artists and is able to make use of it in highly sophisticated ways“ (ibid.: 146) (translation RG). Flusser’s poetic philosophy of fiction is created by fictionalizing philosophy and philosophizing fiction, a movement that goes both ways. The frontier between literature and philosophy is playfully abolished; philosophy becomes a form of literary writing and conversely the philosophical potential of
all literary writing is activated and put into play. „Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten.“, (“Philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry.”), writes Ludwig Wittgenstein. This sentence could also be used as a motto for Flusser’s life-long attempt at developing a multilingual poetic philosophy. His use of different stylistic devices can be seen as a Sprachspiel, a language game in Wittgenstein’s sense. And finally, there is Nietzsche to be taken into account. The German philosopher is relevant for Flusser’s writing practice because of his outspoken opposition to systematic thinking, totalizing forms of meaning and any possibility of absolute knowledge. Any form of understanding is the result a specific point of view and as such fictional. Nietzsche’s skepticism and perspectivism practice a fragmented view of reality in order to expose the frailty and arbitrariness of all possible utterances. After this short digression let me come back to Flusser’s main stylistic devices.

### Metaphors

Metaphors play a central role in Flusser’s texts, most of the time they are used to create new and surprising effects through thought-provoking, sometimes heretical combinations. With his systematic use of metaphors Flusser intends to link disparate fields of knowledge, mixing different discourses, creating new connections with hitherto unconnected or even conflicting discourses. They are an invitation to the reader to play along. In Flusser’s view, that follows Nietzsche’s dictum, any language even on its most basic level is fundamentally an array of metaphors and other rhetoric tropes. Any writing endeavor is, therefore, a play with the metaphoricity of language. In an essay on Flusser’s philosophical fiction *Vampyroteuthis infernalis*, a hybrid text on the border of phenomenology of perception, theoretical biology and logical analysis Abraham Moles speaks of Flusser’s metaphorical imagination jumping from point of view to point of view, creating a disturbing distance from everyday reality and establishing unexpected connections between disconnected areas of thought (Moles 1990: 58). This definition does not only hold true for Flusser’s philosophical fiction which very often brings an animal perspective into play, but can be applied to the whole of his oeuvre.
Flusser ironically makes use of organic and biological metaphors to describe intellectual and mental processes. The cannibalistic metaphor of devoration is not only applied to the process of reading and assimilating new data but also to the relationship of discourses and languages. When a text is translated it is ingested and digested by the target-language. If the text is retranslated in the source language the new text will contain the first language in its belly. Flusser also uses anatomy and physiology to describe the functioning of a specific language. In *A duvida* the process of the creation of a new concept is described as inglobation of a foreign element by an amoeba. This alien component penetrating into the body of the amoeba acts as an *Einfall*, a catalysator forcing the system to generate an innovative solution. In *Die Geschichte des Teufels*, The History of the devil, on the other hand, Flusser introduces the religious metaphor of the seven deadly sins in order to speak about scientific discourse, thus, provocatively abolishing the linear historical narrative that posits religion with respect to modern science in an inferior and prior position.

**Comparison**

One of the most frequent strategies Flusser applies in his texts is comparison – an element already inherent in any process of metaphorization –, not only comparison of different phenomena, for instance media or communication structures, but also comparison of different languages and different words. Flusser’s main intent, when writing, is to create a dialogue, not only with the reader, but also between the different phenomena he writes about. Metaphorization and comparison are bridges in a world of irreducible plurality. Flusser’s nomadic texts engage the reader in constant moving and shifting, jumping from meaning to meaning, forcing him to make his own choices.

The repertoire of each language has a general and a specific potential that can be activated by the writer. This is best achieved when two or more languages are compared to each other, for instance, in translation. In *Retradução enquanto método de trabalho* Flusser writes, „[...] toda vez que eu tentar dar a palavra às coisas, me vejo obrigado a dar a toda coisa várias palavras, constantes dos repertórios das línguas que me informam. O problema com o qual deparo é que tais palavras, adequadas à coisa a ser nomeada, não são congruentes umas com as outras. De modo que não se trata, para mim, tanto de
adequar a palavra à coisa, mas de adequar as várias palavras uma à outra para finalmente adequar tais adequações linguísticas a coisas. Amo tal jogo de palavras, porque permite à coisa revelar várias das suas facetas. E odeio tal jogo porque fascina a ponto de encobrir a coisa. O jogo com palavras, o qual é minha vocação, é o motivo do meu assumir coisas."

The play with words, then, is not an empty formalism but a method to reach out for the world knowing that in order to do this one has to make use of a model and that there is no ultimate truth to be found.

Very often Flusser kicks off his reflections by comparing words from different languages. In order to gain different new perspectives on the subject, in this case the Vampyroteuthis infernalis, Flusser has scribbled with his ball-pen on a loose piece of paper the following multilingual sequence: „Cuttlefish – Tintenfisch – Lula calamar – Sèche.” In Die Geste des Zerstörens, The Gesture of Destruction, for instance, he writes at the beginning: “The fact that the question is asked in German is both an obstacle and a help. German is one of the western languages but not to same degree that many others are which are mostly linked to Latin roots. ‘Zerstörung’ and ‘destruction’ do not exactly mean the same, and this difference makes our dialogue more arduous and enriches it” (Flusser 1994a: 79-80) (translation RG). Each phenomenon is, thus, surrounded by a multilingual cloud of possibilities, a swarm of potential points of view, articulated in the words of different languages.

The technique of comparing words from different languages breaks up the word’s unity and the close link it seems to have with the object it designs, revealing its arbitrariness and opening it up horizontally to other languages and other meanings. Etymology does the same vertically for a single language. The two movements, the synchronical movement along the outer skin of language and the diachronical in depth movement via etymology complement each other. Flusser sometimes combines the two techniques to achieve a double perspective on his subject matter.

**Paronomasia**

One of the most frequent tropes is paronomasia that Flusser introduces with the intent of creating new striking fields of meaning. These unexpected interconnected networks
emerging through word play are sometimes generated with the use of prefixes and operate precariously but productively on the border of the literal and the figural. This strategy is particularly helpful in German and owes much to Heidegger’s style. Flusser describes his multilingual writing practice with the verb *umschreiben* which has a polysemic meaning very aptly capturing the different sides of his endeavor: *umschreiben* to rewrite and *umschreiben* to paraphrase but also literally to write around an idea. Another good example is the German verb *stellen*, to put something upright that is central for Heidegger’s and Flusser’s theory of technicity. The verb *stellen* itself has a very concrete meaning but with the use of prefixes it assumes a much more abstract connotation. Paronomasia also plays with this fundamental ambiguity. In his short text *Die Technik und die Kehre* Heidegger speaks of technicity as the *Ge-stell*, the frame, the rack, but also that which is used to produce reality (*herstellen*) and hide it (*verstellen*). Besides these two verbs, Heidegger also makes use of *berausstellen*, to turn out or emphasize, and *bestellen*, to order, to summon. In his communications Flusser introduces *darstellen*, to represent, to picture, *vorstellen* to present, to imagine and *verstellen*, to feign, to hide. Contrary to Heidegger, whose use of prefixes always operates with an intentional aura of unresolved and mysterious complexity, Flusser uses the different forms of *stellen* to explain the inner dialectics of pictorial and textual representation (*Darstellung*): codes are invented in order to make reality conceivable (*Vorstellung*) but always end up by hiding it (*Verstellung*) which makes the invention of a new code necessary. The use of paronomasia here is strictly functional and clearly removed from Heidegger’s own odd drift towards mysticism. The three interconnected verbs express an abstract meaning that, however, becomes much clearer when understood in its concreteness. To imagine is to place an image before the eye, *vor-stellen*, but this image will hide the reality it was supposed to represent in the first play. The partial homophony is used here to stress the inner contradiction and the resulting dialectic movement.

Another frequently used word play, also to be found in Heidegger, connects *Ding* (thing), *bedingen* (to condition) *unbedingt* (unconditional, not conditioned) and *Bedingung* (condition). In *Stand der Dinge* Flusser describes the human hand as an organ to turn things around, in German *wenden*, adding *umwenden* (turn over, turn inside out), *anwenden* (apply, employ), *verwenden* (make use of) and *entwenden* (steal, purloin) (Flusser 1993a: 71).

Another semantic field, of Heideggerian origin, is constructed around *werfen* (to throw), *geworfen* (thrown), *Geworfenheit* (thrownness) and *Entwurf* (project). In *Dinge und Undinge*
Flusser makes use of *schöpfen* (to scoop, to create), *Schöpfung* (creation) and *Schöpföffel* (dipper, ladle) (Flusser 1993b: 134).

A very telling example of paronomasia in one of Flusser’s early Portuguese texts can be found in *Filosofia da linguagem* where Flusser makes use of a wordplay based on the word *verso*, verse, and the verbs connected with it *verter*, *converter*, *reverter* and *invertir* in order to stress the close connection existing between two opposite but nevertheless complementary ways of thinking. The ascending progressive historical discourse (*discurso ascendente*) transforms (*verte*), that is, translates verses into prose (*converte versos en prosa*). Flusser calls this a *tradução convergente*, a conversion of verses into prose. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a descending discourse (*discurso descendente*) and an inverted discourse (*discurso invertido*) that retranslates the verses that have been transformed through conversation (*conversação*) into prose (*conversos*) back to their origin. This reconversion (*reverter para o verso*) is an inverted translation (*tradução invertida*), a retranslation of prose into verse that Flusser also calls „*tradução concentrica*“ (Flusser 1966: 163) probably because of the concentric circling form of the overall process.

In order to show how languages differ in their most intimate and how this can be used to gain a new point of view, in *A dúvida* Flusser tries to translate the German word-field *Stimme*, voice, *Stimmung* atmosphere, mood, *es stimmt*, it is correct, *ein Instrument stimmen*, to attune an instrument, into Portuguese, to show how the synthetic unity of the German word field falls apart when one tries to translate it analytically into another language. Then he turns the tables on the reader presenting him with a similar word play that is possible in such a density only in Portuguese: “Em contrapartida, torna-se pensável em português o que seria impensável em alemão. A lingual está em acordo, mas não de acordo com o de tudo diferente; há um abismo entre a lingual e o inarticulado sobre o qual nehmun acordo pode lançar ponte” (Flusser 1999: 81).

**Word-Nets**

In *Menschwerdung*, Becoming human, Flusser’s last unfinished and probably most poetic book the play on the literalness of words and the constitution of paronomasic word-nets are used conjointly in order to generate an elegant and refined tapestry of philosophical
concepts. Punning is a self-referential poetic way of philosophizing. “Who has read this text so far”, writes Flusser in an introductory chapter “will have gained the impression, that he is only reading metaphors [...] But the very opposite is the case, the text at hand is far from being metaphorical. It tries to show that one should take phenomena [...] at their word [...] and that most elegant chatter turns out to be metaphoric. [...] It turns out that to take literalness seriously often has a witty and amusing effect. [...] The reader is supposed to laugh; he should be surprised and through this take things seriously” (Flusser 1994b: 186-7) (translation RG). Comparing words from different languages, revealing the etymology of words, creating paronomasic word fields and playing with the figurative and literal side of words then have a common function: They help understanding the things that surround us. Flusser’s rhetoric of multiplication and ambiguity is not intended to lead the reader astray or to subjugate him but to transform him into an accomplice in the language game of the pursuit of a possible truth. Taking words literally is also a way of re-translating language back to the gestures and images that originated them. “When we take words literally they show us what they mean, and they mean images” (ibid.: 199) (translation RG).

One of the main word fields of the text Menschenwerdung, that is basically conceived as a phenomenological anthropology of mankind, revolves around the word der Fall, the case, the issue, the circumstance, literally the fall, a word that also plays a central role in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Flusser uses the literal meaning of the word to create his own highly ironical narrative of the origin of the first human beings. In fact man came into being when the ape fell while jumping from tree to tree – the original jump (der Ur sprung). Humankind, then, as a fallen species of primordial apes (der gefallene Menschenaffe) This was his fall, sein Sünden-fall, ein Sonder-fall, a special case and a very special fall, a significant occurrence (Vor-fall), an accident at the origin (ein Un-fall im Ur-sprung), or rather a form of decay (Zer-fall) and wastage (Ab-fall), a coincidence (ein Zu-fall), an accidental fall (ein zufälliger Fall) or a descent (ein Ein-fall), definitely a liberating fall (ein befreiender Fall), in any case (auf alle Fälle) a striking fall (ein auf-fällender Fall), something conspicuous (etwas Auf-fälliges).
Conclusion

To conclude: Flusser’s philosophical rhetorics of breaking up, multiplying, mixing, comparing, combining, linking and connecting is both a monolingual and multilingual writing strategy used to create novelty and surprise, that is, new information through recombination. As we always need models and metaphors to understand the reality surrounding us but inevitably tend to forget their artificiality once we have started using them, philosophy as a form of language and discourse criticism has to call attention to their inevitable limitations and the filtering and structuring effect they have on our perceptions. Languages are not transparent, even if we tend to look through them as if they were mere windows. Flusser’s philosophy operates, thus, also on a meta-communicative level: language is a model, a net with which to capture meaning, but all language is artificial and words do not primarily mean objects but other words of the same language or different languages. Languages are not primarily representational but interconnected systems of signs. As in the aesthetics of modernism Flusser intends to call our attention to the material side of the medium he is using, to the diversified opacity of his single writing languages. Flusser, finally, wants to achieve these different goals by having us embark with him as dialogical partners on an ironical journey.

Bibliography
