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Disapparatus:

From Prototype to Concept

We know, from Flusser's description of the post-historical condition, that human subjectivity is characterized by a functionalism programmed for the constant improvement of apparatuses – play-things that pallidly simulate human thought and are arranged hierarchically within an automatic and autonomous chain of feedback programming. In this programming chain, the photographic apparatus stands out, as its invention is the origin of the abandonment of linearly structured human existence for a quantum structured one, becoming the "[...] source of the robotization of life in all its aspects"¹ (Flusser 1998: 87). The photographic apparatus is not only the genesis of post-history and a model for understanding other apparatuses, but also a fundamental vector for programming functionaries, since its photographs program their receivers for a second-order magical behavior and lead them to "[...] live, know, value and act in function of photographs" (Flusser 1998: 86).

Within this framework, experimental photography gains great relevance because, in the absurd climate of automation and robotization of life through apparatuses and photographs, its practice is exemplary and essential in the play against the apparatus: in other words, it would be the expression of freedom par excellence; this the fundamental problem. After all, "any philosophy ultimately deals with the problem of freedom" (Flusser 1998: 94). If experimental photography is authentically a gesture - because its movement, rather than expressing a condition, articulates a freedom (Flusser 2014: 16) - that responds (unknowingly) to the problem of freedom through praxis, the philosophy of photography is about raising awareness of this praxis, aiming to "point the way to freedom" by identifying "openings for freedom in the life of the apparatus functionary" and reflecting on the "meaning that man can give to life, where everything is a stupid chance, heading towards absurd death" (Flusser 1998: 96).

We read all this in Vilém Flusser's *Essay on Photography*. The following essay is a contribution to this philosophy, which is perhaps the "only revolution still possible" (Flusser 1998: 96), by proposing a study of the photographic being called *Disapparatus* (→ image 1). To this end, a phenomenological description of the gesture of photographing equipped with *Disapparatus* will be presented, making use of Flusser's conceptual network and his own description of the gesture

¹ All Flusser quotes (1993, 1998, 2010, 2014) are my translations from Portuguese or German.

of photographing, assuming post-history as the time in which we live. The hypothesis to be defended is this: handling the *Disapparatus* engenders a photographic gesture that, inversely to the traditional gesture, problematizes photography from within itself.

The prototype

Originally called *Interferophotoscope*, the *Disapparatus* is a creation of mine and is, technically, a simple and small being that, coupled to the light input of a photographic apparatus, causes the apparatus to produce an image resulting from the superimposition of three images of the environment - namely, from the front, left and right of the apparatus. When used in a photographic apparatus in which the world encoded in an image by the apparatus is shown in real time on a screen (live view) or in an ocular viewfinder, as is the case in modern cameras or smartphones, the superimposition of these images also takes place in real time. In functional terms, this is the description of the *Disapparatus*. Perhaps here we can ask ourselves: by creating superimposed images, how does *Disapparatus* fit within the framework of Flusser's philosophy of photography?

Disapparatus was created with the intention of playing against the apparatus, hence its name. If "*interferophotoscope*" is more faithful to its functional aspect, since it refers to "light interference viewer", "*Dis-apparatus*" is more faithful to its conceptual aspect, since it refers to "negation of the apparatus". What we take here as playing against the apparatus is consciously forcing the apparatus to "[...] produce an informative image that is not in its program" (Flusser 1998: 96), if we take the apparatus to mean the large apparatus. Lenot (2017), who based his study on Flusser's work and investigated dozens of experimental photographic works, defines the play against the apparatus, the experimental photography, as "a deliberate act of critical rejection of the rules of the apparatus of photographic production, whereby the photographer calls into question one or more established parameters of the photographic process" (Lenot 2017: 9). But still, how do I know if I wasn't programmed to create it? How do I know if my intention in inventing it was mine, when the photographic apparatus has robotized life down to the most intimate thoughts, desires and feelings? How do I know that this being isn't, actually, a contribution to improvement of the apparatus? How do I know that, in the end, the parameters of photography have been questioned?

The *Disapparatus* was functionally explained. It was technically constructed from scientific texts and images which, as we know, make up the black box. In this sense, the gesture of creating it may have been completely programmed and, therefore, functional rather than free. And such a gesture, as a possible contribution to the constant improvement of apparatuses, should be taken as a real risk. However, as Flusser reminds us: "A technical issue, however, is never just a technical issue. There is a complex *feedback* between the technique and the man who uses it" (Flusser 2010:

35). The issue of the *Disapparatus* is, therefore, not merely a technical one. This *feedback* that Flusser tells us about, at least with regard to the *Disapparatus*, was not intentionally programmed. In other words, if it was intentionally programmed to technically superimpose images of the environment in real time, phenomenologically speaking it was not programmed to program functionaries to behave according to predetermined models. Whether there is a direct relationship between technique and behavior that can be deduced a priori, to the fullest extent, it is another (probably unsolvable) question, and is beyond the scope of our investigation. Here, the phenomenon as it appears in handling the *Disapparatus* needs to be phenomenologically described. And from this description, two conclusions are possible: a) if even though it is technically distinct from the traditional apparatus, it is phenomenologically similar in its handling, this means yet another victory for the apparatus over the functionary²; b) But if such a technical distinction leads to a gesture that is phenomenologically distinct from the traditional gesture, it opens up the (not certain) possibility of a victory for the human being over the apparatus. In any case, only the phenomenological description of this being can show us whether or not it is an apparatus, what scope it has in the play against the apparatus (if it has any) and, finally, whether it can point us the path to freedom in a functional and automated existence within the universe of post-history.

On the gesture

The *Disapparatus* is a mysterious being. It's clearly technical, but mysterious. Physically, it is light, simple in structure and fits in the hand. It may resemble a prism, but with appropriate distance. Even turning it around in my hand, its "good for" is not readily accessible, as it is for most of the beings in the human world, and in this it constitutes something of its mystery. When properly coupled to a photographic apparatus, the *Disapparatus* appears very similar to the apparatus: it is good for playing, for automatically producing images when pointed to the world. Such phenomenal similarity with the apparatus leads to a similarity of gesture with the *Disapparatus*, albeit initial. Its size and versatility - since it can produce image superimpositions on any photographic apparatus (including the cameras present in smartphones) - makes the *Disapparatus* very simple to use. It is just as easy to carry around and play with as a traditional camera, despite its technical complexity. As Flusser himself says: "Although [the apparatus] rests on complex scientific theories and sophisticated techniques, it is very easy to manipulate. The apparatus proposes a game that is structurally complex but functionally simple." (Flusser 1998: 74). These characteristics make the *Disapparatus* very similar to the apparatus.

² We can see how, despite being technically different in many respects, handling analog and digital photographic apparatuses is a phenomenologically similar gesture, as they were intentionally created for this purpose.

With the *Disapparatus* in hand, properly coupled to the photographic apparatus, what I immediately see through such a set is a complex, confusing image³. I'll call this technical image *disimage*. Although it is confusing, I nevertheless see elements in it (ideas, as Flusser calls them) - for example, buildings, cars and people. However, not only do these elements often appear with a spectral-like consistency⁴, but also the spatial composition of these elements in the *disimage* - that is, the way they are spatially arranged on the plane of the *disimage* - does not reflect the composition I see in the world, leaving me fascinated. In the world, I see some cars on the street and people on the sidewalk, both between buildings. When I decode a traditional technical image, I also see the same composition. In the *disimage*, however, these beings appear one inside the other, or spatially interchanged: I see cars inside buildings with people on top of them. *Disimages*, therefore, do not look as windows, like traditional technical images. The functionary sees these, albeit in a veiled way, as objective representations of the world: "The observer trusts [traditional] technical images as much as he trusts his own eyes" (Flusser 1998: 34). Conversely, *disimages* are seen, when handling the *Disapparatus*, immediately and initially, as confusing or abstract images, at the same time as they carry a magical charge, a fascination, given the "recognizable" elements of the environment that appear interchanged or crossed in them. Epistemologically, they are not taken as seriously as the "true" images that the apparatus gives us. Even though it is distinct from the apparatus in terms of its image coding, the fascination of the *disimages* invites me to keep playing.

When I move the *Disapparatus* horizontally, turning around myself, the elements of the *disimage* move, at first, unpredictably, but regularly. By looking carefully, it is possible to recognize elements that go to the left, and elements that go to the right. The same occurs when rotating it in a clock movement: I see elements that rotate clockwise, and others that rotate counterclockwise, around the center of the *disimage*. All of this is also surprising. Although these patterns have not been programmed, the patterns of a program begin to reveal themselves, like a software emerging from a hardware. We don't want to ask ourselves the metaphysical question about a "software emerging from hardware", but in handling the *Disapparatus*, a program appears. From the point of view of the game, this is what interests me as a player. By mastering its program, seems that I can master it as a whole.

If in the gesture I stop investigating the formation of *disimages* and start hunting properly, according to the gesture programmed by the apparatus, the *Disapparatus* begins to frustrate me.

³ As the *Disapparatus* only works properly when coupled with a photographic apparatus, I will henceforth call *Disapparatus* the being resulting from the coupling of the two (*apparatus+Disapparatus*).

⁴ I call "spectral" the partially translucent, not very saturated and not very solid appearance that the elements of the *disimage* may present. This happens due to the technical composition of the *Disapparatus*, which never captures the total relative brightness of any of the three images it captures, but only captures a part of that brightness.

When Flusser (1998) describes the traditional photographic gesture, he compares the photographer's gesture to that of the Palaeolithic hunter who stalks his prey, except that he hunts in the dense forest of culture. He will try to avoid the intentions hidden in cultural objects, moving against the intentions of his culture in order to capture his prey. He cares little about the interior of the apparatus, or even the world of events and culture. The "outside world" only matters as luminous matter, because "photography is reality" (Flusser 1998: 53). We can easily identify this in the statement, of an interview, by photographer Daido Moriyama: "Photographing the city, cars, people, TV screens, posters, film screens... I consider them all the same. So I wasn't really interested in shooting the TV screen; it was just one subject in my point of view" (San Francisco Museum of Modern Art 2018). But the click that captures the hunt, its codification into a technical image, is just the latest in a series of decisions.

When I am in an urban park, armed with an apparatus, and interested in producing beautiful images of a heron, for example, I need to transcode this intention into a concept, so that it can be transcoded into a scene by the apparatus. This transcoding follows aesthetic criteria that, despite appearing to be external to the apparatus - what I, the distribution channels and my receivers consider to be beautiful - are found within the apparatus's memory. I will, therefore, be manipulating the apparatus, looking for points of view in the space-time around the heron, isolating it from trash cans, buildings and paved paths (consequently circumventing the cultural condition), altering the elements of its tripod (aperture, exposure and ISO), all so that the heron is hunted in an always finite and relatively small quantity of beautiful images of a heron. But always and in the end, my decisions are limited to the imaginative capacity of the apparatus, and any criteria for choices I need to make are already found inside the apparatus. In other words, I can only photograph the photographable and, in this case, any photograph of the heron - whether it follows aesthetic, political or scientific criteria (of beauty, goodness or truth) - already exists limitedly and virtually in the apparatus. All of this we already find, structurally, in Flusser's (1998) description of the gesture of photographing.

In short, the gesture of photographing with a camera reveals a series of programmed decisions: the choice of the hunt, the choice of viewpoints, the choice of "external" criteria. And the more we photograph, the more we master the apparatus. We know more and more which inputs will result in certain outputs, and we are already transcoding without even photographing: this is the post-historical experience. It is worth highlighting that this description of the photographic gesture "does not apply, in its general terms, only to the photographer, but to any functionary" (Flusser 1998: 55). It's natural, then, that when we equip the *Disapparatus*, we gesticulate, at first, in a similar way as we gesticulate with the apparatus. After all, we are programmed to photograph

(and function) in terms of hunting, of points of view, of "external" criteria. But the *Disapparatus*, in its first "objective" uses, seems to refuse to function completely in these terms.

When I go out to photograph equipped with *Disapparatus*, photographing as we were programmed proves to be a very difficult gesture: it is simply not possible to photograph *one* object. If I try to photograph the same heron, which used to be easily photographable, by aiming at it, this time it is "crossed" or placed next to the things that were previously diverted: garbage cans, construction sites, children riding scooters. I cannot, in my gesture, separate the heron from the world in its "individuality", its "isolation", cut it out from the world, suspend it on an idealized and independent plane; like the hunter who, after aiming, shooting and capturing his prey, hangs it on a wall; or like the scientist who, after capturing the animal, isolates it on his laboratory table. Of course, "isolating" it in a strict sense is difficult with the apparatus. In this case, it is common to place it on the microplane of relationships with other things: the water it's in, its shadow, its food, its habitat in the background. Or even manipulate the apparatus in such a way that the background blurs, making the heron stand out from everything else. The *Disapparatus*, however, gives me minimal control over this, as it will "put into view" what the eyes "do not see" (and do not want to see). If I get frustrated and change my point of view, the heron sometimes does not appear⁵, or appears alongside other unexpected things. And as I circle the space around the heron, looking for points of view to hunt it, or use other light entries from the *Disapparatus* in order to capture it, other things appear and disappear, most of the time in surprising, unexpected ways. What seemed like a contingency of first uses becomes clearer each time: *an object never appears "isolated"*. But it only appears crossed or alongside "objects" in the shared space that the apparatus, in turn and based on its categories, originally allows to be circumvented and veiled⁶. And this condition, inscribed in the *Disapparatus* program, prevents me from continuing to operate the *Disapparatus* as a "hunting weapon", and the photographer who insists will struggle in vain.

Every transcoding of my intention into a *disimage* must, in the new gesture, pass through the categories of *Disapparatus*. I can now put aside the old gesture of hunting for objects to play definitely with the new program. I then start walking around, exploring the potential of the new program, but at the same time looking for *disimages* that fit some old criteria that I already have in my memory. After all, it is not possible to photograph naively: "Not even tourists or children photograph naively." (Flusser 1998: 52). Among these criteria, the most appropriate are, promptly, aesthetic criteria. The *disimages* refer, in conceptual similarity, to the so-called non-representative,

⁵ From a technical point of view, even if the heron is in the light capture plane of the *Disapparatus*, sometimes it is covered by another much brighter plane so that, instead of the planes superimpose, the heron disappears.

⁶ Under special conditions, it is possible to isolate objects from their context with the *Disapparatus*. For example, photographing an object that is surrounded by homogeneous walls, or when the object is much brighter than the others. These are exceptions that do not occur in a relatively rich space.

modern or abstract images. You can see some of these *disimages* in the annex (→ images 2 to 6). In this sense, I look for images in *Disapparat* that follow these aesthetic criteria, that are attractive more for their form than for their content, and since photographing in black-and-white helps to emphasize the form, then that is how I choose to photograph. I can look for these *disimages* in a more or less random way, going in and out of bars, parks and bookstores, and letting the *Disapparat* randomly create the relationships of meaning between the elements that appear in the *disimage*, and pressing the “trigger” on the images that impress me aesthetically. I can also, each time, uncouple the set and return to photographing traditionally. But I can also keep handling the *Disapparat* and make a greater transcoding effort, where the compositional elements of the *disimage* are more carefully chosen, so that I put in more intentions of my own (in principle). But regardless of how I choose to photograph, a new spatial relationship begins to reveal itself in the gesture. If in the old gesture the center of the photographic space was the object to be photographed (the hunt), *around* which I-with-the-apparatus jumped between regions looking for beautiful images (as it is described by Flusser), now I-with-the-*Disapparat* place myself in the *middle of* regions that, surrounded by simultaneously photographable objects, I rotate around myself looking for beautiful *disimages* inside the *Disapparat*. *Space appears, therefore, as photographic regions whose center is me.* By transferring the center from the "hunt" to the "hunter", there is a spatial inversion in relation to the old apparatus gesture.

The phenomenological description increasingly shows the image and gestural difference that the *Disapparat* produces from its program, leading us to believe that it is effectively a "negation" of the apparatus. On the other hand, it also shows a base of common aspects that it shares with the old apparatus, which makes it conceptually close to this one. But the gestural difference that the *Disapparat* produces is not a mere difference in content, whose structure is similar. The new transcoding it requires, contemplated in the gesture as a whole, can point out to the photographer new epistemological considerations, whose theses call the apparatus itself into question. In the proper functioning of the "great apparatus", the *Disapparat* program is a *bug*.

We will deal with its *bugged* aspect shortly. What is relevant to us at this point of the investigation is the aforementioned epistemological considerations. I have now said how the *disimages* that the Apparatus produces invite me to treat them from an artistic point of view, and therefore to use aesthetic criteria when photographing. The use of scientific or political criteria was not used because they seemed inappropriate. I was, each time, using "external" criteria to photograph (in the old and new gestures). Even in the production of beautiful *disimages*, I used "external" criteria. We use "external" with quotation marks because we know that they are internal to the apparatus. Flusser does not tell us in his *Essay on Photography* (1998), however, whether or not these criteria historically precede the creation of the apparatus. In our investigation, we see how they precede

the creation of the *Disapparat*, because we see that the “perception” is programmed to judge *disimages* based on them. In this sense, they are only within the *Disapparat* in a partial way, since I do not find the old criteria of truth and goodness in it. It therefore invites us to create new political and scientific criteria, which are more internal, as well as to review aesthetic criteria, since similarity does not imply equality.

So, if we stop to consider these epistemological criteria, what do *Disapparat* shows us in its handling? We saw that, among other things, it does not produce images of isolated objects. But they always appear "next to" or "crossed by" others, present in their spatial context. With the epistemological turn of the criteria, which moves from the *disimage* as a beautiful form to the *disimage* as "true" content (*disimage* as a "window to reality"), the elements of the *disimage*, as it is coded in real time for me, thus appear in a new meaningful relationship that my gaze establishes when circulating through its elements. At first, it is the same temporal relationship - the magical temporality of the eternal return - but a new relationship of meaning, manifested in a double astonishment. On the one hand, the *Disapparat* takes the objects out of their known contextual relations; on the other, it places them in a new contextual relation. This not only brings objects out of a latent state of ontological mystery, disconnected from their ordinary connections in which they usually gain meaning, but also shows them in a new connection, in which they acquire new meaning. In this new sense, the object *is* in the network of signifying relationships that it makes with the other objects of the culture in which it is spatially located⁷. The photographer, who used to circumvent the cultural condition of objects, is now exposed to it. And this only happens, at first, when *handling* the *Disapparat*, because the *disimage* that has already been distributed has already lost its relationship with the context in which it was created. The receiver does not know what it is about, does not know the gesture that created it, and can assume that it is an edition or double exposure⁸. Epistemologically, then, the *Disapparat* is the technical being that can unveil the network of cultural meaning between the objects in a space, or on the other hand open up their existential mystery. It is a being that calls into question the relationship of representation and objectivity between the apparatus and the world, as well as the very notion of the fixed and in-itself meaning of objects.

The *Disapparat*, operated within this framework, also points to a third epistemological consideration. If in the old gesture I saw myself as a privileged being *over the* world – like the hunter *over the* hunt –, in the new gesture, as what the eyes "cannot see" is each time put "in sight", I see myself not merely in the center of a photographic space, as described, but in the very medium of the world. I appear like a fly, more prey than predator, whose eyes have panoramic vision, and

⁷ At least.

⁸ *Double exposure* is a technique in which the photographer takes a picture of an object and then of another object on the same "film", in such a way as to superimpose them. It is a different gesture to the one described here.

whose sensation is to be seen all the time by things that my real eyes do not see. I see myself externalized, as a being among beings, in a space that I observe but am observed by. *I, therefore, do not appear "isolated"*. I am situated in a relationship within a factual world. This is characteristic, to a greater or lesser degree, of what the phenomenological tradition has called *In-der-Welt-sein* or *being-in-the-world*. Epistemologically, the *Disapparatus* is an being that can reveal the photographer's condition of being-in-the-world.

So, what have we got so far? *Disapparatus*, as far as this investigation has gone, is conceptually an apparatus. It is a plaything that invites the functionary to play and explore its program, looking for hidden potential, according to its own categories, and in such an impenetrable way that the photographer gets lost in it. And even if it does not imply a relationship of necessity, it was built on the basis of scientific texts, and works on the basis of an apparatus. Of course, we are not after formal explanations, and in the end the very description of the gesture revealed its apparatus-like character. At the same time, the same description also revealed its counter-apparatus character. The *Disapparatus*'s program is not based on the gesture of hunting for objects, nor exactly on the emancipation of the photographer from the world. Conversely, its program problematizes the given meanings of things and of the self, by pointing to the mystery and existential interrelationship of intramundane beings, and to the very factual condition of the photographer in the world. If the photographic gesture is a philosophical gesture (Flusser 1993)⁹, photographing with *Disapparatus* is philosophizing phenomenologically.

The concept

If we stick to Flusser's computer jargon, as categories of interpretation of post-history – in fact, "we are already thinking about the way computers 'think'" (Flusser 1998: 93) –, the *Disapparatus* program can be understood as a *bug*. Although it also means *insect*, a *bug* in computing is a software error, a flaw in the development or operation of a program, leading it to produce unexpected or unintended results. They are so unwanted that *debugging*, the process of identifying and correcting bugs, has become increasingly automated in software programming. And once a software is on the market, correction patches sometimes come out later, via software updates, to eliminate them. The process is so automatic to the point that many programs send bug reports to developers on their own, and it does not take long for an automatic update to be installed on our apparatuses. Thus, the bug is perceived as a nuisance, something undesirable, like the insect that buzzes in our ears,

⁹ Flusser says: "Since photography was invented, it has become possible to philosophize not only through words, but also through photographs. The reason for this is that the gesture of photographing is a gesture of vision, what the ancient thinkers called *theoria*, and that this gesture results in an image, which would be called by these same thinkers an idea." (Flusser 1993: 106)

disrupting our programmed existence. When intentionally created, it can be classified as *malware*. When it has the ability to reproduce and spread automatically, it can be called a *virus*.

The *Disappear* program was not deliberately created, as we can see, which would remove it from the classification of malware. But neither was it programmed by an apparatus, which would remove it from the classification of mere software. But we can say that it is a *bug*. Now, the *Disapparatus* seems to be that technical insect that sticks to the lens of the apparatus and compromises, by "shaking" the senses from which functionaries operate, the full functioning of the great program; a piece of hardware created whose (unforeseen) software transforms the old predatory photographer into a fly. More than that, every experimental photography practice, in general, seems to be a *bug* or the result of a *bug* that causes the program to produce errors, causes functionaries not to function correctly, causes apparatuses not to be perfected. However, in both Flusser (1998) and Lenot (2017), the latter who paid special attention to experimentation in photography based on Flusser, it is not clear to what extent experimental photography impacts on long programming chains. In other words, to what extent this *bug* affects the functioning of the great apparatus. Both emphasize the praxis of freedom, in the act of photographing by singular experimental photographers, but we do not understand how this praxis affects the black box, or whether it can be spread, or how the products of this praxis – the "experimental images" – affect the receivers, or even how they are processed by the distribution channels.

I will not deal with the issues of reception and distribution of experimental images or *disimages*. However, if something distinguishes *Disapparatus* from most other experimental practices, it is its latent viral capacity. Not only is the simplicity that characterizes handling it rarely found in other photographic beings that purport to be (or are subsequently categorized as) experimental, but its design is also cheap and made to be produce industrially. When we look at the list of photographic experiments, as organized by Lenot (2017), we observe not only the uniqueness of each of these experiments, but also the presence of a complexity in the gesture or in the beings used. It is not as if it were simple to take a photograph using one's own vagina, or to produce or operate a horizontal camera obscura with multiple holes. In short: these are not easy photographs to make, which could mean that the problematization of photography is accessible to the few who have grasped it or have the technical ability to do this praxis. Conversely, the simplicity and replicability characteristic of the *Disapparatus* makes it democratic. After all, when it comes to apparatuses, democracy is "[...] the amateur photographer only obey[ing] increasingly simple modes of use inscribed on the outside of the apparatus" (Flusser 1998: 75). If the professional photographer or artist has created problems with the apparatus in the course of handling it, the *Disapparatus* reaches the amateur photographer already pointing out problems. It is a marketable plaything, whose program has inscribed within it the problematization of the meanings of representation, of objects, of

space, and of oneself. If the democratization of the apparatus has made deciphering photographs more difficult, since the amateur photographer "[...] believes that photographing is the automatic gesture by which the world appears." (Flusser 1998: 75), on the other hand, the democratization of the *Disapparatus* has the opposite effect, since handling it, instead of making the world appear as if through a window, potentially calls into question the world, the observer and the very notion of a window.

This is where the possibility arises, perhaps, of thinking about *Disapparatus* beyond itself, distinguishing it from other beings and practices within the great breadth of photographic experimentation. We could, therefore, call disapparatus any apparatus or accessory whose program points to the problematization of itself. Firstly, this implies that the disapparatus must be an apparatus or apparatus accessory and therefore have the basic aspects of one. In other words, it must look like a plaything, be easily handleable and industrially reproducible, among other essential characteristics. In this sense, not every photographic being created in an experimental practice could be considered a disapparatus, but only those that retained their playfulness, simplicity and virality. Secondly, the program must be directed against itself, and this means that the gesture engendered from the game with the program must be a gesture directed against the apparatus, the result of a problematization of the meanings traditionally inscribed in it - which only the described experience with the being can reveal. If we are thus aiming for a collective problematization of photography, in favour of perhaps the last revolution still possible in the rescue of human freedom (Flusser 1998), the creation of photographic disapparatuses, by potentially pointing out the problem of the apparatus to the average functionary, could contribute for such.

Final considerations

It was not my intention in this essay to describe the gestural diversity that *Disapparatus* produces in the functionary, nor to evaluate the distribution and reception of its *disimages*, nor to investigate all the new criteria that it opens up for us. In short, it has not been explored to its full potential. This description is, therefore, far from finished, and the hypotheses opened up here must be further investigated. The very construction of the concept of disapparatus is deliberately brief and suggestive, and only indicates that the definition of experimental photography is, perhaps, too broad when we need to think more precisely about the importance of democratizing experimental apparatus in the play against the apparatus.

I would point out that the *Disapparatus* created and described here is only a prototype. It is not strictly the first one (probably), and its technical and programmed constitution is just a possibility. There are other ways of creating disapparatuses, other programs. The problematizations that

Disapparatus points out are also possibilities. Despite being latent in its program, they may never become effective in the play: the *Disapparatus* can be uncoupled from the apparatus at any time, and the turn towards epistemological criteria may never occur. For this and other reasons, the phenomenon, as it appeared and was described, requires greater intersubjective corroboration, and therefore collaboration from other photographers and phenomenologists. This would involve the reader recreating the *Disapparatus*, creating their own disapparatuses or using (perhaps) existing ones, with the aim of describing them phenomenologically, so that a dialogical network can be established. After all, "[t]he researcher is never alone in the world, there are always others with him." (Flusser 2014: 54)

The mutation in the gesture of researching, and now in the gesture of photographing, makes it increasingly clear: "[...] we are part of concrete reality, deeply involved in it, and inseparably permeated by it. In short: we admit that our being in all its manifestations [...] is a being-in-the-world." (Flusser 2014: 53)

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ANNEX




Image 1: Photograph of the *Disapparatus* attached to a smartphone



Image 2: Programa universal, espaço (2022) - Interferoensaio N°2



Image 3: Untitled (2022)



Image 4: Axodentrílico (2022) - Interferoensaio N°4



Image 5: Deslocal, trilha técnica (2022) - Interferoensaio N°5



Image 6: Untitled (2022)